January 20, 2020, Kazakh Aviation Administration reported interim results of inspection and findings identified at that moment. At that time, serious findings associated with the operation of aviation engines that stop from the identification of their origin operated hours and records of failures were revealed. There were damages to the fuselage and other parts of the aircraft, false documents about their maintenance and repair. The airline did not ensure that the engineering service and the flight crew complied with the mandatory procedure for the hand inspection of the wings before the flight to detect icing, which was required by the Fokker Operation Manual.

In general, at that time it was clear that the Flight Safety Management System of the airline did not meet the requirements of the law, Aviation Administration says.

Based on the results of the inspection, many other significant findings and shortcomings were identified that are the basis for suspension of airline certificates. These are concealment of an aviation incident, the use of fake pilot training certificates to obtain access to this type of aircraft, generating false documents on aircraft maintenance and other violations.

The airline did not indicate the real cause of the aviation incident that occurred on 12/25/2019 with Fokker-100 UP-F1017 aircraft.

After departure from Nur-Sultan International Airport towards Shymkent city, the Captain discovered a failure of hydraulic system No. 1 associated with complete leakage of hydraulic fluid, which led to a failure to activate flaps, of control of the front landing gear, elevator, ailerons, reverse and other equipment.

Despite the critical situation, the Captain continued to fly using emergency hydraulic system No. 2 and after landing at Shymkent airport, he reported to air traffic controller the false information stating it as a failure of the front landing gear control.

The airline issued proforma certificates to pilots about the completion of Aviation Security and Dangerous Goods Transportation retraining course. During the inspection, it turned out that at the time of the classes and tests they were on a flight mission in other regions of the country.

The facts of falsification by two airline pilots of retraining certificates for the type of aircraft Fokker 70/100 were revealed. When studying at the training centre in Latvia, they could not pass a practical exam, and therefore they were given only a certificate confirming that they attended the course, which does not give them the right to get permission to control the specified type of aircraft.

To obtain the required admission in the pilot’s license, they provided a fake certificate of successful completion of the course to the authorized body. The training centre confirmed that certificates were falsified.

Currently, aviation personnel certification withdrawal is under consideration.

Bek Air does not have a valid support contract with the aircraft engine manufacturer - Rolls Royce. Moreover, the operational data of aircraft engines were not sent to the manufacturer for their processing, nor were they processed by BEK AIR JSC on their own, which is a violation of the Engineering Procedures Manual.

Thus, the airline did not monitor the state of aircraft engines; accordingly, it did not possess information about their reliability and the risks of flight failure.

The airline at its own discretion, without approval by the authorized body, assigned engineers the category, as well as engineers who do not have the appropriate access, got clearance to perform technical and operational work on aircraft.

The fact of falsification of maintenance document for Fokker-100 UP-F1014 aircraft by two airline engineers at Almaty airport was revealed.

On the day of false performed work, the aircraft actually was performing the flights in Afghanistan.

The results of the unscheduled inspection of Bek Air JSC operation held by Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan were sent to the airline.

Bek Air will have 10 days to submit to Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan a plan of corrective actions.
If the findings are not resolved within 6 months, the Operator’s Certificate and Certificates of Airworthiness will be withdrawn.